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The purpose of this thesis is to apply the U.S. Army
AMORE (Analysis of Military Organizational Effectiveness)
Model to the Charles F. Adams Class Guided Missile
Destroyer. This model was used to analyze the inport and
underway manpower requirements by simulating personnel
manning under different scenarioes. The model identified
key personnel for meeting mission requirements under condi-
tions that may lead to loss of personnel. AMORE is particu-
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I. INTRODUCTION
Almost all organizations have personnel and materiel
that are more important than others in accomplishing the
organizational goal or mission. These important assets,
personnel or materiel, could be referred to as essential to
an organization's survival.
What is the value of the essential assets to an organi-
zation or unit? What is the cost of a lost asset which is
considered essential? Can the unit recover from such a
loss, and if so, how long will it take? When a unit
recovers, how effective is it compared to its effectiveness
before the loss? If increased sophistication causes
increased specialization, how much more vulnerable is a unit
after an essential loss? Could increased generalization
reduce vulnerability of a highly specialized unit without
decreasing its effectiveness gained by sophistication?
"Historically, the measures of unit combat effectiveness
which have been used in combat models, simulations, and war
games have been based almost exclusively on attrition
counts." [Ref. 1: p. 32] What does attrition mean in regard
to the readiness or effectiveness of a combat unit? If a
unit has suffered 15% casualties, is that unit now 85%
effective? In the past, the analyst or military officer has
used attrition counts as a general guide or indicator of
unit capability. The problem is that simple attrition
counting leaves interpretation of remaining unit effective-
ness to the analyst.
Attrition for a military unit can be broken down into
personnel attrition and materiel attrition. Different mixes
of loss or attrition of personnel and materiel can mean
different things for different types of units.
A 10% loss of personnel affects a unit's capability
differently depending on the makeup of that loss. Some
units are more dependent on individuals with command and
control skills (decision makers); others are more dependent
on those with operator skills or maintenance skills.
As with personnel, materiel has different implications
for different types of units. Some units are more materiel
dependent than others. Complexity, time and cost to repair,
and the amount of diminished capability to materiel must be
taken into account when attrition or partial loss of equip-
ment has occurred.
Personnel attrition and materiel loss are often listed
separately in combat models, simulations, and war games.
But what, if any, is the relationship between the two? With
a loss of a part of an asset, be it personnel or materiel,
an organization usually has remaining assets that can
substitute for the loss. Both personnel and materiel are
important to an organization and are often interdependent.
The Analysis of Military ORganizat ional Effectiveness
(AMORE) model (or method) was developed for the U.S. Army in
1976 to analyze the effects of personnel and/or materiel
degradation on a unit. The methodology recognizes that a
unit's effectiveness is not fixed in time, that a unit has
the ability to reorganize or reconstitute its remaining
resources, and that time itself is a resource. [Ref. 1: p.
32]
The purpose of AMORE is to assess a military unit's
capability as a function of time after suffering some losses
of assets. Through the AMORE methodology, personnel and
materiel degradation are simulated in a computer model.
Then a military organization's ability to reorganize quickly




Reconstruction is accomplished through the use of a
transportation algorithm which uses the strength (initial
quantity of assets) as supply, unit requirements as demand
and a substitution matrix as the cost of the transfer. The
longer the time for transfer of a remaining asset for an
attrited asset, the higher the cost.
The AMORE methodology can be used to design personnel
.and materiel requirements for new units. It can also be
used to assess current units to determine if there are addi-
tional requirements or excess resources. Or it can be used
to assess a unit's capability to handle new mission require-
ments with assets currently alloted in order to show where
additional personnel or materiel might be needed. AMORE may
also be used to judge the capabilities of potential adver-
sary units
.
Besides being a tool for the planning of personnel and
materiel, the AMORE process can be a training tool as well.
An AMORE simulation can show where current weak points exist
in organizations so that prioritized training can be
conducted for a unit to reach required levels of capability
quickly .
A. THE AMORE APPROACH
AMORE is a model used to simulate any organizational
mission where loss of personnel and material can be
expected. Through a computer simulation, many iterations of
multiple missions for a single unit can be conducted taking
into account different probabilities of unit asset loss.
After degradation to the unit takes place, AMORE analyzes
personnel, materiel, and the total unit while reconstruc-
tion of the unit is taking place using a transfer matrix.
The computer model requires- the input of a great deal of
information. Input parameters may be altered easily in
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order to test multiple "what if" questions. The required
inputs are as follows:
1. Time increments and number of iterations.
2. Mission of the unit
3. Initial quantities of assets
4. Mission essential teams (MET)
5. Probabilities of degradation
6. Transfer matrixes of assets
Through the AMOR.E model, the computer simulation will
calculate the capability of a unit at time intervals
desired. Capability will be expressed as a percentage of
mis~sion essential teams reconstructed for personnel,
materiel and combination of the minimum average of both.
The output of the AMORE simulation will depend on the
initial number of personnel and materiel assigned, the prob-
ability of degradation, the total number of mission essen-
tial teams input and the transferability of assets for the
unit. The inputs are explained below.
1. Time Increments and Iterations
The time increments are the sections of time at
which the user desires a snapshot of the percentage of
reconstruction of personnel, materiel, and a combination
minimum of mission essential teams which were rebuilt. The
iterations are the number of simulations the user desires
the computer to run without any change to any inputs. The
minimum is an average of all iterations (combining both
personnel and materiel) at a time increment and represents a
total units' ability. U.S. Army use of AMORE has shown
that 25 to 50 iterations provide the best average results
regardless of the type of unit. Less than 25 iterations may






The unit mission is not input in the literal sense,
but is of primary importance to the analyst because the
mission determines the requirements for essential teams.
Though the mission is a heading input for the AMORE simula-
tion, it has no direct effect on the simulation.
3 Initial Quantities
Initial quantities are simply the amounts of assets,
personnel and materiel, that are available for the unit.
4. Mission Essential Teams (MET )
With a mission defined, a unit is then broken down
into the functions needed to accomplish the mission. The
personnel and materiel used to accomplish these functions
are built into teams and are called mission essential teams
(MET) . The minimum requirement of assets for mission accom-
plishment
,
both personnel and materiel, are assigned to
these teams. These teams are cumulative and represent a
reconstruction of a unit's capability to accomplish a
mission.
Each mission essential team may be an equal or
nearly equal contributor to the entire unit. Such indepen-
dent teams are similar in capability and can function with
the loss of other mission essential teams around them.
However, if a more essential team is degraded, immediate
reconstruction is required. Independent team structure
usually considers each team as an equal or nearly equal
contributor
.
Interdependent mission essential team structure is
also possible. The contribution of the teams to the unit
are not equal. In an interdependent unit the order of
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mission essential team construction may be critical, but
less essential teams may have a higher contribution to unit
capability
.
An example of independent Mission Essential Team
construction is a U.S. Army tank company. Each mission
essential team represents a tank. Thus each team could have
repetitive assets that would represent equal or nearly equal
contributions to unit capability.
In this tank example, the personnel mission essen-
tial team one consists of four personnel (a tank commander,
a gunner, a loader, and a driver), and a materiel mission
essential team one consists of the tank. The mission essen-
tial team two would include the same types of assets as team
one but the tank commander would have the skills and capa-
bility to function as a tank platoon sergeant so as to be
able to coordinate the use of two tanks as a more effective
fighting unit. Team three would be identical to team one.
At this point the cumulative team sequence of the unit would
be three tanks and 12 personnel.
The construction of mission essential teams would
continue in this way with increased command and control
added at certain stages to better handle the company of
tanks. Teams would also be included for the unit that
provide maintenance, logistics, and administration in order
to increase sustainability of the unit. An example of a
possible entire tank company mission essential team buildup
is located in appendix A.
With AMORE it is important to note that the first
mission essential team is always the first team recon-
structed if need be. For the tank example it makes little
sense to have a team two with a tank leader without another
tank to lead. Remaining asset substitution occurs after any
degradation and always starts with the first mission essen-
tial team building up as far as possible for the total unit.
14
Mission essential teams of personnel and materiel are both
listed individually for separate analysis. The computer will
later join the two for total unit analysis.
For a U.S. Navy ship, the makeup of mission essen-
tial teams is often more interdependent. A ship cannot
usually be looked at as a number of independent groups such
as tanks. For Navy application, the first team must start
from some basic capability such as the ability to move and
generate power. Team one could be the ability for a ship to
move on one engine and provide electricity. The team one
for personnel and materiel would consist of the assets
required to accomplish basic ship mobility.
Mission Essential Team one would provide the founda-
tion for further team construction. The second team could
be made up of the men and materiel needed to fight with one
weapon system such as one gun. The third team could be
another weapon system such as a missile system. The fourth
team could build the capability of the ship more by
providing the personnel and materiel for another engine
thereby increasing mobility. Team construction could
include all aspects of engineering, weapons and detection,
logistics and administration for multiple missions.
The dependent nature of Navy mission essential team
construction is a reliance on mobility type (engineering)
teams to provide basic power for the other teams.
Specialization of personnel and materiel as well as volume
and weight restrictions require this dependent nature.
5 . Probability of Degradation
With the mission essential teams established
utilizing available assets of personnel and materiel for
mission accomplishment, the next step in the AMORE method-
ology is establishing the probability of degradation. The
probability of degradation is established for each
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individual asset both personnel and materiel. According to
the AMORE user's manual, the effect of the degrading mecha-
nism (assigning the probability of degradation) on a unit
with the assumed mission (mission stated) and posture (the
mission essential teams established earlier) must be evalu-
ated to determine the personnel and materiel degradation
probabilities. These effects may vary between personnel
skill groups and equipment types due to inherent differences
in personnel postures and equipment vulnerabilities. A
variety of methodologies may be used for the evaluation.
The universally accepted Joint Munitions Effectiveness
Manual (JMEM) methodologies are commonly used to establish
probabilities of degradation from simulated attacks.
[Ref. 2: pp. 1-6]
Another commonly used practice is to analyze para-
metrically degradation of a unit. This is simply analyzing
the unit with many different degradation probabilities.
Different levels of degradation can produce different
effects to a unit. The effects of degradation to a unit is
more critical when a unit is unable to reconstruct back to
100%.
6 . Transferability of Assets
The next step of the AMORE process is to set up the
transfer matrices of unit assets. Separate transferability
matrices are made for personnel and materiel functions.
A transfer matrix represents the unit commander's
flexibility to reconstruct the unit after degradation. This
flexibility of the commander is due to the ability of
various personnel and items of equipment to function in
positions other than their designated position. The times
of transfers consist of the time it takes an asset to get
into position to take over a function as well as the time
needed for the substituting asset to become familiar with
16
his new function in the newly reconstructed team. For
instance, in the earlier example of the tank company, a
transfer of a headquarters team First Sergeant (team 16 of
appendix A) should he be used to fill the position of a team
four Platoon Leader, the total time of transfer should
include the time it takes the First Sergeant to get to the
tank of team four plus the time to refamiliarize himself
with the current situation of the team.
The times of transfer can often vary for individuals
due to skill or experience levels of the personnel doing the
substituting. The times may also vary due to unit training
and the time since the last practice of the skill that a
certain individual may be required to fill.
The same type of transferability matrix exists for
materiel as well. A recovery or maintenance team may be
able to transfer or repair materiel that is damaged and
thereby build up the materiel teams.
The interdependency of the personnel and materiel is
accounted for in the AMORE process. A tank out of commis-
sion without personnel attrition is still a personnel team
not available unless it can transfer to other materiel that
is available or unless the materiel can be substituted for
or repaired. All of this interaction of materiel and
personnel has time delays associated with transfers.
B. U.S. NAVY APPLICATION
This thesis deals with the Charles Adams Class Guided
Missile Destroyer, (DDG-2 through DDG-24). This ship is a
multi-mission destroyer containing a capability in all four
of the major missions of a surface vessel. These missions
include Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) , Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW)
,
Ant i- Submarine Warfare (ASW) , • and Naval Gunfire Support
(NGFS) of Marine or Army personnel ashore. A breakdown of
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the ship's weapons, size, and complement is included in
figure 1.1 from Jane's Fighting Ships 1983. This ship type
was selected because of its sophistication and multi-mission
role and because the author served on a ship of this class
for four and one half years in the Engineering and
Operations Departments.
Chapter two of this thesis will demonstrate the inputs
required for the AMORE simulation run. The demonstration
will take the form of a base case of an Adams Class
Destroyer inport in an auxiliary steaming status. The
personnel analysis will be of a typical duty section for
this class of ship in this situation. The second section of
chapter two will demonstrate the outputs of AMORE. Chapter
three will continue with the inport overseas base case, but
will demonstrate the effects of alternative decisions that
could be made for the unit
.
C. ISSUES TO BE ANALYZED
This analysis will focus on the personnel analysis of
the Adams Class Guided Missile Destroyer. Though AMORE can
integrate both personnel and materiel, a complete analysis
of materiel will not be conducted. Materiel analysis will
be included, but at a simple level.
Some of the issues to be analyzed are as follows. What
kind of personnel manning mix is important for the Adams
Class Destroyer in an inport readiness status? What func-
tions are most important for an emergency sortie with only
duty section personnel onboard? For an emergency scenario,
how can a unit become more capable when degradation is prob-
able but the positions that will be degraded are unknown?
The AMORE methodology considers the minimum functions
which are required for a given mission. Then, with initial
assets degraded, AMORE will demonstrate where weak choke
18
Displacement, Tons: 3,370 standard; 4,500 full load
Dimensions, feet: 437 x 47 x 20
Engineering: 2 geared steam turbines, 70,000 shp,
2 shafts, steam provided by 4
boilers at 1200 psi
Speed: 30 knots
Complement: 354 (24 officers, 330 enlisted)
Missiles: Harpoon, surface-to-surface; Tarter,
surface- to-air ; Asroc, surface-to-
subsurface. No matter the launcher
can load, direct, and fire about six
missiles per minute .Approx . 40 missile
magazine
.
Guns: 2 five inch 54 cal
Anti- Submarine Weapons: 2 triple torpedo tubes, as
well as Asroc mentioned above.
Design: These ships were built to an improved
"Forrest Sherman" class design with
aluminum superstructures and a high
level of habitability including air
conditioning in all living spaces.
Modernization: Beginning in FY 1980 it was planned
to give certain ships of this class a
mid-life modernization, officially
known as "DDG upgrade"
.
Radar: 3D search; SPS 39 or SPS 52;
2D air search SPS 40 or SPS 29;
surface search SPS 10,
fire control 2 SPG 51C/D, SPG 52A.
Rockets: Mk 36 Super RBOC chaffroc
Sonar: SQS 23 or SQQ 23,
T-Mk 6 Fanfare torpedo decoy system.
(Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 1983-84)
Figure 1.1 Adams Class Destroyer.
points could be eliminated with specific cross- training or
modifications to unit design.
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The purpose of this application is to identify specifi-
cally the personnel functions that would be most advanta-
geous for cross- training . An emphasis on general training
will decrease the time it takes for substituting from one
job or task to another as well as increase the number of
jobs that each person can substitute for. This training can
be shore-established and be conducted in boot camp as well
as in individual unit training on each ship.
An IBM 3033 Mainframe Computer was used to run the AMORE
Model shown here. Computer software also exists for Apple
II desk top personal computers. Microcomputer technology
gives each individual unit commander or officer in charge of
a unit duty section the ability to analyze the unit or
section capability.
20
II. REVIEW AND BASE CASE
In this chapter the Analysis of the Military
Organization Effectiveness model inputs and outputs will be
presented. An inport duty section base case will be intro-
duced for the model. This base case will continue to be
used in chapter three to analyze different inport manning





The AMORE methodology requires identification of the
functions which are needed to accomplish the unit's mission.
The base case mission is for an inport auxiliary steaming
duty section to get the ship underway from a pier. This
mission is one of the primary requirements of any U.S. Navy
inport duty section when their ship is overseas or in a
readiness status in homeport . For this example, a worst-
case scenario will be assumed. The time is after normal
work hours with a maximum liberty policy; both the
Commanding Officer and Executive Officer are ashore. It is
dark and the fueling pier the ship is moored to catches
fire. The ship must get underway quickly.
2 Initial Personnel Strengths
The initial strengths of personnel for the base case
are derived from the Ships Manning Document (SMD) of an
Adams Class Destroyer (in this case, USS Tattnall DDG-19).
A standard four section watchbill was derived from this SMD.
From a discussion with experienced Surface Warfare
Officers, forty-one positions have been identified which are
21
TABLE I
INITIAL STRENGTH OF DUTY SECTION PERSONNEL
PERSONNEL DATA





5 STB BRG 1
6 PORT BRG 1
7 BMOW 2
8 HELM 1
9 LEE HELM 2
10 BRIDGE STAT BOARD 2
11 CIC SUPERVISOR 1
12 CIC RADAR NAV PLOT 1
13 SPS 10 RADAR NAV 1
14 RADAR SURFACE SEARCH 1
15 NC2/DRT PLOT 1
16 1JV BRIDGE PHONE 1




19 1 JV FANTAIL 1
20 LINE 1 NON TECH PERS 7
21 LINE 2 NON TECH PERS 7
22 LINE 3 TECH PERS 6
23 LINE 4 NON TECH PERS 7
24 LINE 5 NON TECH PERS 7
25 LINE 6 TECH PERS 6
26 1ST LT FORECASTLE 1




29 RADIO ASSISTANT 2
30 EOOW 1
31 BTOW 3
32 UPPER LEVELMAN 3
33 BURNERMAN 4
34 FIREROOM MESSENGER 4
35 MMOW 3
36 LOWER LEVELMAN 3
37 THROTTLE 4
38 ENGINEROOM MESSENGER 3
39 SSTG SWBD OPERATOR 3
40 GYRO WATCH 2
41 AFTER STEERING 2
needed to get a ship of the Adams Class underway. These
forty one positions are considered the most important to get
the ship underway with duty section manning and no other
22
outside assistance. The functional positions are listed in
table I along with the initial strengths assigned to each
position from a typical duty section. A brief description
of each functional position is included in appendix B.
Another realistic aspect of initial strengths is
that the engineers (positions 30-38) with a steaming (oper-
ating) engineering plant are in a two-section inport
watchbill
.
3 . Initial Materiel Strength
In order to keep the materiel analysis simple, only
ten materiel functions were included in the base case
mission. These ten materiel functions provide a simplified
breakdown of the equipment needed for various functions of
the base case mission. The materiel functions listed are
materiel equipment configurations common to all Adams Class
Destroyers. The materiel items being considered for the
destroyer are listed in table II along with the repair times
for light and moderate damage.
There are two firerooms with two boilers each on
this class of ship. The repair time for light damage of
five minutes was small due to the many backup systems
located in the firerooms for each boiler. By attempting to
keep materiel analysis simple, the MET buildup would be very
general. A fireroom or engineroom usually has two to three
times the equipment necessary to keep itself considered as
operational for this scenario. Light damage therefore would
usually be handled by starting another piece of machinery
and isolating the affected machine for repair later. This
assumption is in contrast to the normal AMORE requirement of
having mission essential teams consist of the minimum
required to complete the mission. Moderate damage repair
time would be applicable to machinery that would require









TYPE NAME SUPPLY TIME TIME
1 FWD FIREROOM 1 5 60
2 AFT FIREROOM 1 5 60
3 FWD ENGINEROOM 1 5 60
4 AFT ENGINEROOM 1 5 60
5 STEERING 2 2 25
6 ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION 2 30
7 JV PHONE CIRCUIT 1 2 20




10 RADAR 1 15 90
Time in Minutes
Two steering motors are onboard this type of ship,
and four ship service turbine generators each capable of
providing enough electricity for the ship in this base case.
The phone circuits are independent, but possess the ability
to augment each other. Two gyros are onboard this type of
ship and usually one surface search radar. The repair times
for all the equipment is subjective and admittedly opti-
mistic. As with propulsion, light damage for this example
reflects the crew starting backup equipment, and moderate
damage reflects immediate attempts at repair.
4 . Mission Essential Teams
Personnel and materiel needed to perform each func-
tion are divided into teams. Teams are constructed with the
assets needed for various levels of unit operational capa-
bility, and thus represent increments of increasing
24
capability. Essential teams are defined as "the breakdown
of the unit into components (teams) which contain only the
personnel and materiel that are absolutely necessary to
mission accomplishment." [Ref. 2: pp. 1-6] As stated
earlier, simple materiel analysis conducted here may indued
backup flexibility which contains more than that which is
absolutely necessary.
For Navy application, another change in the normal
AMORE methodology is needed. Mission Essential Teams are
usually considered to represent equal, or nearly equal,
slices of unit capability. This is due to the independent
nature of mission essential teams for most Army applica-
tions. For this application, the first mission essential
team is established with a capability to accomplish the
mission. However, satisfactory completion of the mission is
highly in doubt due to the difficulty of severly limited
command and control, mobility, and navigational capabili-
ties. The more mission essential teams that are recon-
structed for the base case, the more likely the mission of
quickly getting underway will be realized.
a. Personnel
The personnel for the base case example were
broken into seven essential teams and are displayed in table
III. A first essential team is made up of those personnel
required to get the ship underway as quickly as possible.
Safety isn't the main concern nor is having to navigate the
ship down a long channel. The engineering plant is one
boiler and one engine. Team one is the minimum needed to
get the ship underway quickly. For this initial example 18
personnel were determined to be the absolute minimum
required with the engineering plant configuration as





PERSONNEL MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAMS
PERSONNEL REQUIRED FOR MISSION 1
ESSENTIALS ESSENTIALS ESSENTIALS ESSENTIALS
FOR TEAM FOR TEAM FOR TEAM FOR TEAM
TASKS 1 2 3 4















16 1 1 1 1
17
18 1 1 1
19 1 1 1 1
20 1 1 1 1
21 1 1 1 1
22 1 1 1 1
23 1 1 1 1
24 1 1 1 1





30 1 1 1
31 1 1 1 2
32 1 1 1 2
33 1 1 1 2
34 1 2
35 1 1 1 2
36 1 1 1 2
37 1 1 1 2
38 1 2
39 1 1 1 1
40 1 1
41 1 1 1 1
•
26
Table III (cont 'd.
)
PERSONNEL MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAMS
ESSENTIALS ESSENTIALS ESSENTIALS






3 1 1 1
4 1 1
5 1 1 1
6 1 1 1
7 1 1 1
8 1 1 1







16 1 1 1
17 1 1 1
18 1 1 1
19 1 1 1
20 2 2 2
21 2 2 2
22 2 2 2
23 2 2 2
24 2 2 2
25 2 2 2
26 1 1 1
27 1 1 1
28 1 1
29 1 1
30 1 1 1
31 2 2 2
32 2 2 2
33 2 2 2
34 2 2 2
35 2 2 2
36 2 2 2
37 2 2 2
38 2 2 2
39 1 1 1
40 1 1 1
41 1 1 1
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Team two is cumulative and contains personnel
who increase command and control capability. Being cumula-
tive means that with team two the mission has additional
personnel available. Or put another way, both team one and
team two are being utilized to accomplish the mission. The
overall assumption here is that with more personnel the
likelihood of mission success will increase.
Team two adds the Engineering Officer of the
Watch position (EOOW) , as well as that of the 1JV phone
talker on the forecastle. The addition of the phone talker
in team two makes it easier and quicker for the Officer Of
the Deck (00D) to relay line handling orders and obtain
information from the forecastle. Otherwise, this type of
information flow would have involved the 00D and personnel
on the forecastle communicating information over a fair
distance with their voices. This makes communication more
difficult and error-prone. Any information to or from the
fantail (furthermost back of ship where line handlers are)
would have been impossible. Adding the Engineering Officer
Of the Watch (EOOW) to team two was done to better coordi-
nate and control the engineering function. This position
wasn't required in team one due to the assumption that if
the EOOW didn't arrive on station the Machinist Mate Of the
Watch (MMOW) would be able to fill in for the EOOW as well
as do his own job.
As additional teams are added, it can be seen
that with only team ONE the ship is capable of getting
underway but with the additional teams, the ship is even
more capable of getting underway or getting underway more
safely
.
Team three adds two engineering messengers, one
for the fireroom and one for the engineroom. This adds a
better monitoring capability for the two main propulsion
spaces but still only gives the ship a one shaft capability.
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Team four adds the additional engineering
personnel that give the ship the two engines with two
boilers, and thereby increasing capability and flexibility.
Team five adds additional command and control personnel as
well as visual navigation personnel and additional personnel
to assist with line handling. The additional line handlers
would allow the ship to now recover the lines instead of
cutting them.
Teams six and seven add personnel to communicate
with radio and to navigate with radar as a backup to visual
navigation. More personnel are added as backup to the
earlier essential team personnel and now the personnel of
the duty section are exhausted.
b. Materiel
Seven mission essential teams of materiel were
set up. Team one provided one fireroom and one engineroom
in order to provide the ship with the capability to get
underway with one engine. Also included in team one was the
electrical distribution system, the ship steering system,
and the 1JV phone circuit
.
No other machinery was added until team four
when the other fireroom and engineroom were added to coin-
cide with the personnel of mission essential team four that
provided additional engineering flexibility. Team five
added the JA/JL phone circuit and electronic gyro to coin-
cide with the personnel who were now assisting the 00D with
visual navigation and team six added radar for the combat
information center (CIC) team to conduct surface radar navi-
gation and surface shipping surveillance. The construction
of the seven mission essential teams for this base case is
displayed in table IV.
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TABLE IV
MATERIEL MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAMS
MATERIEL REQUIRED "FOR MISSION 1
ESSENTIALS ESSENTIALS ESSENTIALS ESSENTIALS










3 1 1 1 1
4 1
5 1 1 1 1
6 1 1 1 1














2 1 1 1
3 1 1 1
4 1 1 1
5 1 1 1
6 1 1 1
7 1 1 1
8 1 1 1
9 1 1 1
10 1 1
5 . Probability of Personnel Degradation ( Losses or
Absentees )
The next input requirement is the personnel degrada-
tion. This is a probability of attrition for each personnel
position. Personnel attrition doesn't necessarily have to
reflect a combat casualty. It could be a man missing his
assignment due to confusion, being ill that day, or being
injured in an accident on his way to station.
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For this base case scenario an arbitrary 30% prob-
ability degradation (PD) for personnel was applied. This
30% was selected so as to insure a full range of output for
demonstration purposes. The actual probability of degrada-
tion applied by any AMORE user would be determined by the
scenario envisioned. Also the probability of degradation
for personnel or materiel can be entered into the model
separately with different values for each individual asset.
Many combat simulations state that 30% attrition is enough
to consider a unit "out" or needing replacement.
6 . Transferability
a. Personnel
The next step was to design the personnel
transfer matrix. A portion of this matrix for the forty one
positions discussed earlier is shown in table V The
complete transfer matrix is shown in appendix B. The times
are in minutes. When there is only a period (".") the posi-
tions are considered not transferable. For instance, posi-
tion number 8 is the position of HELM, which is the function
of steering the ship. Moving across the matrix on row 8
shows that this man cannot transfer into position 1 or 2
which are the 00D (Officer of the Deck) or JOOD (Junior
Officer of the Deck) but, in 1 minute, he could substitute
for starboard bearing taker (column 5) on the starboard
bridge wing.
The times selected for the transferabilities are
the expected time it would take to transfer to, and function
at, the new positions. The transfer times are one of the
most subjective portions of the AMORE input.
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TABLE V
TRANSFER MATRIX OF PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS
TRANSFER MATRIX FOR PERSONNEL




4 NAVPLOT2 0011511 10
5 STB BRG 5 5 1.111
6 PORT BRG 5 5 10 111
7 BMOW 110
- 8 HELM 115
9 LEE HELM 115
10 BRIDGE STAT BOARD 115
11 CIC SUPERVISOR ill
12 CIC RADAR NAV PLOT 111]L . 1 1 1
13 SPS 10 RADAR NAV 1 1 5 i> . 5 2 1
14 RADAR SURFACE SEARCH 10 10 ) . 10 10 5
15 NC2/DRT PLOT 5 !) . 5 5 3
16 1JV BRIDGE PHONE 10 1() . 1 1 1
17 JA/JL BRIDGE PHONE
1JV FORECASTLE
10 1() . 1 1 1
18 15 1!5 . 5
19 1 JV FANTAIL
20 LINE 1 NON TECH PERS ! i6
21 LINE 2 NON TECH PERS • 15
22 LINE 3 TECH PERS i > I . 5
23 LINE 4 NON TECH PERS ! io
24 LINE 5 NON TECH PERS . 5
25 LINE 6 TECH PERS ! 5
26 1ST LT FORECASTLE i > IS 5 5














39 SSTG SWBD OPERATOR
40 GYRO WATCH
41 AFTER STEERING ; k) 10
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b. Materiel
The materiel substitution matrix is designed
similarly to the personnel matrix. The ability of materiel
functions to substitute for other materiel functions is
TABLE VI
TRANSFER MATRIX OF MATERIEL FUNCTIONS







7 JV PHONE CIRCUIT













no substitution is possible
usually more limited than that of personnel. The materiel
substitution matrix is shown in table VI.
There is one additional time that is entered
which affects the time it takes for reconstruction of the
unit and this is commander's decision delay time. This time
reflects the time it would take for a person in charge to
decide what transfer should take place and execute the
necessary command to effect this. The delay time may be
different for each personnel function and materiel item.
The delay time may also differ for light and moderate damage
to materiel as well.
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B. AMORE OUTPUT
1 . Unit Capability
TABLE VII






0.051 0.051 0.206 0. 119 0.011 0.020
MINIMUM 0.029 0.035 0.206 0.119 0.011 0.020
0.250 0.686 0.100 0.269 0. 131 0.200 0.107
0.500 0.874 0.076 0.423 0.149 0.389 0. 143
0.750 0.874 0.076 0.543 0.133 0.503 0.131
1.000 0.909 0.055 0.651 0.119 0.629 0. 114
1.250 0.909 0.055 0.714 0.111 0.686 0. 107
1.500 0.909 0.055 0.714 0.111 0.686 0. 107
1.750 0.909 0.055 0.714 0.111 0.686 0.107
2.000 0.909 0.055 0.737 0.111 0.709 0. 107
2.250 0.909 0.055 0.737 0.111 0.709 0.107
2.500 0.909 0.055 0.737 0.111 0.709 0. 107
2.750 0.909 0.055 0.754 0. 100 0.726 0.097
3.000 0.909 0.055 0.754 0. 100 0.726 0.097
3.250 0.909 0.055 0.754 0. 100 0.726 0.097
3.500 0.909 0.055 0.754 0. 100 0.726 0.097
3.750 0.909 0.055 0.754 0.100 0.726 0.097
4.000 0.909 0.055 0.754 0.100 0.726 0.097
INFINITY 0.909 0.055 0.754 0.100 0.726 0.097
ITERATIONS 25
The unit mean capabilities is the first output of
the AMORE model. Table VII shows the unit capability after
the first computer run. The first row of table VII shows
the unit capability at time 0.00 in terms of personnel capa-
bility, materiel capability, and then a combined total value
for the organization. At time with a 30% degradation
level the personnel capability is shown to be 0.051 or 5.1%
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capable. Materiel at the same time is 20.6% capable. This
5.1% of personnel capability is about 5 percent of the
mission essential team reconstruction. With seven mission
essential teams this means 5.1% of seven teams.
The minimum (second row) is the capability evaluated
immediately after the start of the reconstitution. All
transfers are in progress, but only those with a total time
of zero have been completed. [Ref. 2]
After 15 minutes, 0.25 hours in table VII, the
average personnel capability was 68.6 percent with a stan-
dard deviation of 10.0 %. This resulted from the transfers
of personnel that took place as established in table V The
quickest (shortest) transfers were accomplished in the order
of personnel MET (mission essential team) one to seven.
Also within this same 15 minutes, on average, materiel
recovered to 26.9% of capability.
The 68.6% personnel capability can be misleading.
This represents 4.8 teams (68.6 times 7) being reconstructed
on average over 25 iterations. To properly interpret the
capability from reconstructing 4.8 teams, a capability
contribution weight for each mission essential team must be
determined. For this example, table VIII shows the percent
contribution that each personnel mission essential team
contributes to the overall successful mission
accomplishment
.
These percentage contributions are subjective. The
additional command and control of MET two, three, and six
were given the least weight at 5%. A weight of fifteen
percent was assigned to team four for the additional maneu-
verability of the ship. A fifteen percent contribution was
also given to team five for channel navigation assistance.
Team seven (CIC personnel) was assigned a 10% contribution
for radar backup for navigation (team 5) and shipping
surveillance assistance for the 00D . Reconstructing 4.8
teams (68.6% of the teams) thus yields 81% unit capability.
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TABLE VIII







MET 7 ..... 10%
At 0.25 hours, materiel shows a capability of 26.9%.
Materiel usually reconstructs more slowly than personnel for
two reasons: materiel has less substitutability and the
transfer times are larger overall compared to personnel.
But again, capability as shown in table VIII can be
misleading
.
The 26.9% represents 1.8 teams out of seven being
reconstructed on the average. Refering back to table IV, as
long as materiel MET one is reconstructed there are no other
new requirements until materiel MET four. Having materiel
MET one reconstructed would represent at least a contribu-
tion of 55%. (55% is contribution or the first 3 MET of table
VIII) .
Having 1.8 mission essential teams reconstructed
when there are no additional materiel requirements until MET
four, can be confusing. What must be remembered is that
this analysis is for an average of 25 iterations. For one
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of the iterations materiel MET one was unable to be recon-
structed and for five iterations materiel MET four had some
needs. The 1.8 is an average of these 6 iterations. How
this information was obtained will be explained in the next
section.
The table VII shows Personnel recovering to 90.9% at
1 hour. This represents an average reconstruction of 6.36
teams. With 6 complete teams, the unit for this example is
considered 90% capable when MET percentage contribution is
applied. Materiel, however, recovers only to a 73.7% at two
and a quarter hours. Again materiel appears to be more
critical and the weak link for the example. (Most U.S. Army
analysis finds materiel consistently showing less capability
than personnel.)
2. Needs and Surplus ( Chokepoints )
Table IX shows an optional part of the AMORE model
output, the Sensitivity Analysis Needs and Surplus of the
simulation. In AMORE term: :ology these needs are often
refered to as chokepoints. The chokepoint analysis gives
information about what has happened to the organization. It
shows which personnel positions were exhausted and therefore
did not allow the organization to recover to 100% capa-
bility. Sensitivity analysis is accomplished separatly for
personnel and materiel.
In table IX each personnel task is displayed along
with corresponding columns for needs and surplus of each
position. "Team Four" appears at the top of the table.
This is the MET at which the AMORE model "choked". Also
notice at the bottom of these same columns, the number of
iterations, (2 iterations for this example), is displayed.
The model could only build the first three METs on two of
the 25 iterations. It then went ahead and tried to build
team four and kept track of needs and surpluses. Looking
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TABLE IX
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS NEEDS AND SURPLUS
,
PERSONNEL






AVERAGE ST. DEVIATION AVERAGE ST. DEVIATION
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.71
3 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.71
4 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.71
5 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.71
6 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
7 0.00 0.00 1.50 0.71
8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00
10 0.00 0.00 1.50 0.71
11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.71
13 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
14 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.71
15 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
17 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.71
18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
20 0.00 0.00 5.00 0.00
21 0.00 0.00 3.50 0.71
22 0.00 0.00 3.00 1.41
23 0.00 0.00 3.00 1.41
24 0.00 0.00 3.50 0.71
25 0.00 0.00 4.00 1.41
26 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.71
27 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.71
28 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.71
29 0.00 0.00 1.50 0.71
30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
32 1.00 1.41 0.00 0.00
33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
35 0.50 0.71 0.00 0.00
36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
39 0.00 0.00 1.50 0.71
40 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.71
41 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
NUMBER OF LTERIONS 2
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down the average needs column, positions 32 (BTUL) and 35
(MMOW) were needed in order to complete team four.
A value of 1.00 for position 32 (BTUL) represents an
average need of one position 32 for two iterations . This
need is occuring on the attempt to reconstruct MET four.
Table III showed that at MET four, two people were needed to
fill position 32. On both attempts to build MET four, one
position 32 was not filled. The value of 0.50 for position
35 means much the same thing: for two iterations an average
of 0.50 position 35 ' s were not filled. This means on one of
the two iterations when position 32 was not filled, position
35 was fully filled (MET four requires 2 personnel at posi-
tion 35) and on one of the iterations when one person was
needed for position 32, one person was needed for position
35 as well.
Another optional AMORE output, the Sensitivity
Analysis Assignment Matrix, can help the analyst determine
what caused the need. This output will be discused in the
next section.
The surplus column shows the surplus personnel
available during the 2 iterations when only three teams
could be built. For instance, position 25 was surplus at a
value of 4.00. This value of four persons is possible
because the surplus, like needs, is an average. On the two
occasions there was an average of four extra position 25
personnel
.
The sensitivity analysis continues for the remaining
iterations. Table X shows that on eight of the iterations,
the model choked trying to build the seventh MET. As can be
seen in table X position 1, 2 and 11 caused this to happen.
At the end of the sensitivity analysis computer
output, an average surplus of each position is displayed for
the number of iterations that all mission essential teams
were reconstructed. Table XI displays this average surplus
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TABLE X
SENSITIVITY ANALYSYS, PERSONNEL CONTINUED






AVERAGE ST. DEVIATION AVERAGE ST. DEVIATION
1 .38 0.52 0.00 0.00
2 .50 0.53 0.00 0.00
3 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 .00 0.00 0.13 0.35
10 .00 0.00 0. 13 0.35
11 .50 0.53 0.00 0.00
12 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00
14 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00
15 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00
16 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00
17 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00
18 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00
19 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00
20 .00 0.00 1.13 1.25
21 .00 0.00 2.50 1.60
22 .00 0.00 0.13 0.35
23 .00 0.00 3.00 1.60
24 .00 0.00 2.25 0.89
25 .00 0.00 1.13 1.46
26 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00
27 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00
28 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00
29 .00 0.00 0.25 0.46
30 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00
31 .00 0.00 0.25 0.46
32 .00 0.00 0. 13 0.35
33 .00 0.00 0.50 0.93
34 .00 0.00 0.63 0.74
35 .00 0.00 0.25 0.46
36 .00 0.00 0. 13 0.35
37 .00 0.00 0.38 0.52
38 .00 0.00 0.25 0.46
39 .00 0.00 1.00 0.76
40 .00 0.00 0.63 0.52
41 .00 0.00 0.75 0.46
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS 8
.
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for the base case. Note that for 15 of the 25 iterations
all mission essential teams were reconstructed even with a
probability of degradation of 30% for all personnel.
Table XII shows the sensitivity analysis needs and
surplus for materiel. The same type of information is
displayed as for personnel, but in addition, materiel posi-
tions are also displayed with light and moderate damage.
The first ten rows represent materiel that is a total loss.
Table XII shows that materiel chokes once trying to build
team one. Though not displayed here, materiel choked for 5
iterations attempting to reconstruct team four, for 4 itera-
tions on MET five, two iterations on team six, and was able
to build every MET 13 times.
3 . Sensitivity Analysis Assignment Matrix Output
Table XIII shows the assignment matrix output. The
results displayed in table XIII are also optional for an
AMORE simulation. Assignment matrices for each mission
consist of the average survivors for those iterations used
to build a particular maximum number of teams. When MET
four choked for the two iterations (from table IX), table
XIII shows what substitutions had been made to build the
three MET up to that point.
In the first group of columns (3 by 7 matrix under
first dotted line) task 1 has a value of 1.00 (asterick next
to number referred to here). This represents the 00D (task
1) substituting for only himself. The second group of
columns (group under second dotted line), shows that task
seven under column eight has a value of 0.50 and task eight
under column eight has a value of 0.50. This means that on
the average when three mission essential teams could be
built, 0.5 of the time position eight was filling in for
itself (didn't suffer any degradation) and 0.5 of the time a
position seven person was filling this position.
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TABLE XI
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS SURPLUS WITH ALL MET
RECONSTRUCTED
















































NUMBER OF ITERATIONS 15 .
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TABLE XII
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS NEEDS AND SURPLUS, MATERIEL










2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
5 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
6 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LIGHT
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 • 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MODERATE
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS 1.
For the base case, the task seven substitute could
have moved from his MET, which was MET five (table III), or
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TABLE XIII
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ASSIGNMENT NATRIX




TASK 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 00
7 D.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 00
8 D.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 00
TASK 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TASK 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.50 00
32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 00
33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 00
34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 00
35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 00
36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 00
37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 00
38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .00
39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 00
TASK 34 35 36 37 38 39
31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
34 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
35 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
36 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
37 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.00
38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
more likely came from the initial strength pool. That is to
say, in personnel MET construction only one person is
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required to fill the functions of task seven and eight. But
as table I initial showed earlier, the initial strength of
position seven was two and for position eight was one.
There was an extra position seven person assigned to the
unit. If this person wasn't attrited he would be a most
logical substitution.
As table XIII demonstrates, analysis of the optional
computer output can show substitutions that wouldn't be
obvious from table IX. Without this additional information
the analyst would have been unaware of substitutions between
the BMOW and Helm positions (positions 7 and 8).
~ 4 . AMORE Outputs Summarized
For unit analysis, the AMORE inputs must be totally
understood in order to understand the AMORE outputs. The
first product is labeled "unit capability" and is a
percentage of mission essential team reconstruction. If the
MET are equal or nearly equal contributors then this
computer output represents unit capability as labeled. If
MET are not equal contributors then additional calculations
must be accomplished to determine unit capability. The
optional computer outputs of sensitivity analysis needs and
surplus and sensitivity analysis assignment matrix should
always be used to best understand what is happening to the
unit. Without the optional outputs much misunderstanding
could occur. The optional outputs also provide information
for planning changes in manning or training policies in
order to improve the capability of the organization.
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III. AMORE APPLICATION TO INPORT DUTY SECTION
Analysis of all the outputs showed this organization to
be sensitive at the OOD , JOOD , CIC SUPERVISOR, BTUL, and
MMOW positions. Improvements in the unit's capability will
be attempted by reducing the sensitivity for the two officer
command and control postions as well as the engineering
billets. The changes to the inputs of the model will repre-
sent policy or training implementations to improve the read-
iness of the unit.
If the capability configuration resulting from a partic-
ular set of resonable input parameters is too low' to be
acceptable, then the input information may be changed to
improve capability. However, changes in the input data must
reflect actual changes in training or manning characteris-
tics or be consistent with reasonable proposals for policy
change. Manipulation of input parameters which do not
reflect the realities of environment and practical policy
may give "comfortable" results but will not give useful
guidance to analysts or policy makers.
A. CROSS-TRAINING
1 . Changes in Substi tut ability
In order to improve officer command and control
capability, the officer position of Engineering Officer Of
the Watch (EOOW, task no. 30 in table V) was also allowed to
be substituted for the OOD and JOOD positions. This posi-
tion was assigned a ten minute transfer time. Ten minutes
is the minimum time it would take an EOOW to turn over the
watch to an MMOW and for the EOOW to get to the bridge and
assume control of the ship for the OOD or JOOD. With this
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additional officer, capability moved up to 91.4% after one
hour. See table XIV for capability analysis of this second
computer run.
TABLE XIV






0.017 0.016 0.217 0.113 011 014
MINIMUM 0.006 0.010 0.217 0.113 006 010
0.250 0.737 0.120 0.240 0.125 211 111
0.500 0.851 0.088 0.383 0.142 349 131
0.750 0.880 0.084 0.440 0.142 434 142
1.000 0.914 0.065 0.486 0.147 480 147
1.250 0.914 0.065 0.503 0.143 497 143
1.500 0.914 0.065 0.509 0.143 503 143
1.750 0.914 0.065 0.531 0.138 526 138
2.000 0.914 0.065 0.571 0.136 566 136
2.250 0.914 0.065 0.606 0.124 600 124
2.500 0.914 0.065 0.606 0.124 600 124
2.750 0.914 0.065 0.623 0. 117 617 117
3.000 0.914 0.065 0.623 0. 117 617 117
3.250 0.914 0.065 0.674 0.113 669 114
3.500 0.914 0.065 0.674 0.113 669 114
3.750 0.914 0.065 0.674 0.113 669 114
4.000 0.914 0.065 0.697 0.102 691 104
INFINITY 0.914 0.065 0.737 0.091 731 093
ITERATIONS 25
The overall capability of the organization improved
given the assumption that either the Machinist Mate Of the
Watch (MMOW) or the Boiler Technician Of the Watch (BTOW)
were able to substitute for the EOOW and whoever substituted
for the EOOW would in turn have someone capable of filling
in for his position. The stringent PEB (Propulsion
Examination Board) exams that all surface ships now have
every 18 months make this an acceptable assumption.
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Current U.S. Navy manning and training policy
requires Officers assigned to engineering to become 00D
qualified. This policy is different from that of other
navies, such as the countries of the British Commonwealth,
where Deck Officers and Engineering Officers specialize in
these two different areas. The U.S. Navy Officer EOOW may
or may not yet be qualified as an 00D but has had at least
six months of training in seamanship prior to being assigned
to any ship.
Another of the initial chokepoints was the MMOW. On
this class of ship the EOOW usually is in the same compart-
ment as one of the MMOWes and can easily substitute for this
position. When the EOOW is an officer and can substitute
for the 00D and MMOW, the need for both positions requiring
a substitution can cause a problem. Usually the 00D has
fewer other substitutes than the MMOW, and therefore the
EOOW would substitute for the 00D . Both 00D and MMOW are in
MET one for this example, but the initial strength for 00D
is one and for MMOW it is three.
If an EOOW has the skills to substitute for both a
MMOW and an 00D , a policy must be stated as to which posi-
tion the EOOW should fill if both attrited positions are
equally important. By equally important, it is meant that
both the MMOW and 00D are in the same MET. Keeping the
EOOW in engineering, as was in the base case, we now train
some senior enlisted or intensify training for Officers or
Chief Petty Officers in the 1ST LT and OIC/CPO AFT LINES
positions
.
Removing the transferability of EOOW to 00D and
inserting instead the 1ST LT (job no. 26) and OIC/CPO AFT
LINES (job no. 27) with a transferability of 20 minutes
resulted in the capability analysis shown in table XV.
The transfer times were 20 minutes because the jobs
of 1ST LT and OIC/CPO AFT LINES in this scenario are senior
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TABLE XV






0.051 0.049 0.171 097 006 010
MINIMUM 0.046 0.049 0.171 097 006 010
0.250 0.766 0.102 0.269 112 240 112
0.500 0.840 0.103 0.389 138 326 130
0.750 0.909 0.078 0.463 125 446 126
1.000 0.909 0.078 0.543 124 509 123
1.250 0.914 0.078 0.583 122 549 122
1.500 0.914 0.078 0.583 122 549 122
1.750 0.943 0.055 0.617 127 611 126
2.000 0.943 0.055 0.657 122 651 120
2.250 0.943 0.055 0.657 122 651 120
2.500 0.943 0.055 0.669 121 651 120
2.750 0.943 0.055 0.686 112 669 112
3.000 0.943 0.055 0.686 112 669 112
3.250 0.943 0.055 0.703 103 686 103
3.500 0.943 0.055 0.703 103 686 103
3.750 0.943 0.055 0.720 092 703 092
4.000 0.943 0.055 0.720 092 703 092
INFINITY 0.943 0.055 0.720 092 703 092
ITERATIONS 25
enlisted possibly resulting in longer transfer times.
Senior enlisted would probably take a little more time to
assume the function of 00D than another officer since offi-
cers have more formal schooling and probably more practice
at being an OOD . The training proposed for this analysis is
on-the-job training (OJT) by individual commands as was done
briefly by the U.S. Navy in the mid 1970' s.
The times of substitution of positions 26 and 27 are
long, reflecting little practice and no formal schooling.
The Chiefs here would probably be deck- oriented with
possible Tug Master experience in their background. The
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time for transfer would depend on each duty section's
officer or chief assigned to duty section 1ST LT or OIC/CPO
AFT LINES. The officers usually assigned to these positions
are very inexperienced.
As can be seen in table XV, 94.3% personnel capa-
bility is obtained at one and three quarters hours.
Combining the effects of both EOOW and 1ST LT or
OIC/CPO AFT LINES had the surprising result of bringing the
capability down from when just the 1ST LT and/or OIC/CPO AFT
(hereafter called deck supervisors or chiefs) were the only
new substitutions for 00D and JOOD. Table XVI shows the
capability results with all three positions substitutable
for 00D.
The sensitivity analysis needs and surplus computer
output showed that with the three additional positions now
substituting for 00D and JOOD, even more positions in engi-
neering had needs. Giving the EOOW the authority to
transfer for 00D of MET one caused problems when attempting
to build the team for the second propulsion plant, MET four.
As was stated in chapter two, the engineers are
already in two section (day on day off) duty. Having these
personnel already standing more duty than any other types of
personnel shows their criticality to a ship in the readiness
status of this scenario. Keeping the officer EOOW more
specialized in engineering gives the ship better capability
provided a training policy of increased use of deck supervi-
sors be used to substitute for command and control
positions
.
The data of the capabilities in tables VII, XIV, XV,
XVI are displayed graphically in figure 3.1 for the first
two hours. Figure 3.1 shows different strategies of trans-
ferability for the 00D and JOOD positions while maintaining
all other inputs of the base case the same. The graph shows
that adding the EOOW to the transfer matrix (line OODEOOW)
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TABLE XVI






0.051 0.045 0.137 0.094 006 010
MINIMUM 0.051 0.045 0.137 0.094 006 010
0.250 0.709 0.124 0.234 0.120 223 119
0.500 0.829 0.116 0.337 0.127 314 123
0.750 0.846 0.104 0.417 0.127 371 118
1.000 0.909 0.078 0.469 0.126 429 118
1.250 0.909 0.078 0.520 0.110 480 105
1.500 0.909 0.078 0.543 0. 115 503 111
1.750 0.937 0.055 0.554 0.119 543 114
2.000 0.937 0.055 0.554 0.119 543 114
2.250 0.937 0.055 0.594 0.116 583 111
2.500 0.937 0.055 0.617 0. 118 594 115
2.750 0.937 0.055 0.634 0. Ill 611 107
3.000 0.937 0.055 0.634 0. Ill 611 107
3.250 0.937 0.055 0.634 0. Ill 611 107
3.500 0.937 0.055 0.634 0. Ill 611 107
3.750 0.937 0.055 0.634 0. Ill 611 107
4.000 0.937 0.055 0.634 0.111 611 107
INFINITY 0.937 0.055 0.674 0.103 651 101
ITERATIONS 25
eventually increased personnel capability, but at one half
hour the capability was less than if the OOD and JOOD alone
could transfer for each other (line OOD). This was due to
the average engineering personnel needs having a greater
effect at this point.
The 00DCP0 line also dips below the OOD line at one
half hour. This is most likely due to the long transfer
times of positions 26 and 27 (the chiefs) for the OOD and
JOOD. Combining the EOOW and Chiefs to the transfer matrix
for OOD and JOD is shown by the line labeled 00DCP0E00W.
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Figure 3.1 Capabilities With Differing Substitutions
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chiefs substitute for the 00D and JOOD because moving the
EOOW out of engineering is less effective than leaving him
in this department
.
2. Varying Mission Essential Teams
Next the EOOW was moved to team four and therefore
was only needed when both engineering plants were on line.
During this time the MMOW would coordinate the one fireroom
and engineroom himself.
TABLE XVII






0.126 0.067 0. 189 108 023 031
MINIMUM 0.051 0.049 0.189 108 017 030
0.250 0.731 0.116 0.257 114 251 113
0.500 0.869 0.097 0.371 131 371 131
0.750 0.926 0.066 0.429 141 429 141
1.000 0.949 0.055 0.537 125 537 125
1.250 0.949 0.055 0.577 122 577 122
1.500 0.949 0.055 0.663 122 663 122
1.750 0.949 0.055 0.663 122 663 122
2.000 0.949 0.055 0.680 113 680 113
2.250 0.949 0.055 0.720 104 720 104
2.500 0.949 0.055 0.760 092 754 091
2.750 0.949 0.055 0.760 092 754 091
3.000 0.949 0.055 0.760 092 754 091
3.250 0.949 0.055 0.783 090 777 089
3.500 0.949 0.055 0.783 090 777 089
3.750 0.949 0.055 0.783 090 777 089
4.000 0.949 0.055 0.783 090 777 089
INFINITY 0.949 0.055 0.783 090 777 089
ITERATIONS 25
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Using the same types of parameters as were compared
in table XIV and table XV, the capability matrix in table
XVII was the result when both the EOOW (10 minutes transfer
for 00D and JOOD) and the 1ST LT or OIC/CPO AFT (20 minutes
transfer for the 00D and JOOD) were combined into the
transfer matrix. Moving the EOOW to MET four represented
the policy of having a MMOW trained to handle one plant
underway propulsion requirements, and thereby reduced a
position in MET two. This type of policy reduced the worth
of an EOOW. With this change, the organization recovered
better and more quickly. It resulted in a 94.9% capability
at one hour as compared to 93.7% in one and three quarter
hours. But again, analysis of sensitivity needs and surplus
showed engineering chokepoints.
By keeping the EOOW position specialized in engi-
neering, the unit reconstructs even better. As table XVIII
shows, having more deck substitutes even at twice (20
minutes) the transfer time as EOOW (10 minutes), the unit is
better off.
Figure 3.2 shows the capability outputs graphed when
the MET construction had the EOOW in team four instead of
team one. This strategy then analyzed the initial base case
transfer matrix when only the 00D and JOOD could substitute
for each other. Then analysis was conducted adding just the
EOOW with a transfer time of 10 minutes for positions one
and two, then just the chiefs with 20 minutes for positions
one and two, and finally combining both EOOW and chiefs into
the transfer matrix for the 00D and JOOD. This is a similar
analysis to that conducted in section one of this chapter.
All inputs were kept constant except changes to the transfer
matrix after the EOOW was moved to MET four.
Again it was seen that keeping the EOOW in engi-
neering and training the chiefs to be OOD's or JOOD's
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TABLE XVIII






0.126 0.067 0.189 0.108 0.023 031
MINIMUM 0.051 0.049 0.189 0.108 0.017 030
0.250 0.731 0. 116 0.257 0. 114 0.251 113
0.500 0.869 0.097 0.371 0.131 0.371 131
0.750 0.926 0.066 0.429 0.141 0.429 141
1.000 0.949 0.055 0.537 0.125 0.537 125
1.250 0.949 0.055 0.577 0.122 0.577 122
1.500 0.949 0.055 0.663 0. 122 0.663 122
1.750 0.949 0.055 0.663 0.122 0.663 122
2.000 0.949 0.055 0.680 0.113 0.680 113
2.250 0.949 0.055 0.720 0.104 0.720 104
2.500 0.949 0.055 0.760 0.092 0.754 091
2.750 0.949 0.055 0.760 0.092 0.754 091
3.000 0.949 0.055 0.760 0.092 0.754 091
3.250 0.949 0.055 0.783 0.090 0.777 089
3.500 0.949 0.055 0.783 0.090 0.777 089
3.750 0.949 0.055 0.783 0.090 0.777 089
4.000 0.949 0.055 0.783 0.090 0.777 089
INFINITY 0.949 0.055 0.783 0.090 0.777 089
ITERATIONS 25
ultimately provided the best capability. This was true even
when the EOOW was considered less valuable to engineering
(moving the EOOW to MET four).
3 . Varying MET Priority
An individual unit may desire to train in such a way
as to change the way a mission is accomplished. In the base
case, the mission essential teams had the ship mobility in
MET one and MET four. What if getting the ship underway
with only one engine isn't possible? The ability for a ship
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Figure 3.2 Capability E00W Moved to MET Four.
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ports and how the ship is moored. If the assets are avail-
able, getting two engines in operation isn't a difficult or
a lengthy process.
In order to increase mobility the MET four positions
31 through 38, were placed in MET two. With all other
inputs of the base case the same as was established in
chapter two, 25 iterations were run. Table XIX shows the











0.040 042 0.251 0.113 0.034 041
MINIMUM 0.034 041 0.251 0.113 0.034 0. 041
0.250 0.629 152 0.360 0.130 0.269 123
0.500 0.766 139 0.509 0. 125 0.446 0. 138
0.750 0.766 139 0.566 0. 128 0.474 141
1.000 0.766 139 0.577 0.131 0.486 145
1.250 0.766 139 0.617 0. 127 0.520 143
1.500 0.766 139 0.617 0.127 0.520 143
1.750 0.766 139 0.617 0.127 0.520 143
2.000 0.766 139 0.617 0. 127 0.520 143
2.250 0.766 139 0.617 0. 127 0.520 143
2.500 0.766 139 0.640 0.119 0.543 138
2.750 0.766 139 0.640 0. 119 0.543 138
3.000 0.766 139 0.640 0. 119 0.543 138
3.250 0.766 139 0.651 0.122 0.554 141
3.500 0.766 139 0.651 0.122 0.554 141
3.750 0.766 139 0.651 0. 122 0.554 141
4.000 0.766 139 0.651 0. 122 0.554 141
INFINITY 0.766 139 0.651 0.122 0.554 141
ITERATIONS 25
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Table XX shows a portion of the sensitivity analysis
needs and surplus output for the increased mobility run. In
table XX shows that for 3 iterations MET one couldn't be
built due to the 00D and JOOD positions.
The 0.67 values for task 1 and 2 represent the 00D
(task 1) and JOOD (task 2) positions not being filled for
MET one, for two of the three iterations.
Table XXI shows that for another three iterations,
MET two couldn't be built due to a shortage of engineering
billets. The 0.33 values for tasks 30, 31, and 35 of table
XXI represent each position not being filled for one of the
three iterations that mission essential team two couldn't be
built .
Increasing the emphasis on mobility brought the
capability of the unit down after degradation. The posi-
tions that choked are roughly the same. In this basic model
the officer command and control positions are sensitive as
well as many of the engineering positions. Using the same
change in substitutability as earlier, the deck supervisors
were allowed to transfer for the 00D and JOOD, and the EOOW
was kept in engineering. Table XXII shows the capability
results. Capability only reached 78.9 percent in one and a
half hours. This reflects an increased emphasis on MET two
instead of four. Earlier the model had engineering needs at
team four, and the percentage reconstruction needs were
computed as team four of seven teams. Now these same needs
are at team two instead of team four. This reflects a
smaller percentage capability on the average and thus table
XXII shows 78.9 percent where table XVIII showed 94.9
percent
.
4. Probability of Degradation Change
The probability of personnel degradation may seem
too high at 30%. Different degradation probabilities may
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TABLE XX
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS INCREASED MOBILITY





TASK AVERAGE ST DEVIATION AVERAGE ST. DEVIATION
1 0.67 0.58 0.00 0.00
2 0.67 0.58 0.00 0.00
3 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
4 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
5 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.58
6 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.58
7 0.00 0.00 1.33 1.15
8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.58
10 0.00 0.00 1.67 0.58
11 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.58
12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.58
14 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.58
15 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.58
16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
17 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.58
18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
20 0.00 0.00 3.67 1.53
21 0.00 0.00 5.00 1.00
22 0.00 0.00 3.67 0.58
23 0.00 0.00 3.00 1.00
24 0.00 0.00 4.00 1.00
25 0.00 0.00 2.00 1.73
26 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.58
27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
28 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.58
29 0.00 0.00 1.33 1.15
30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
31 0.00 0.00 1.33 0.58
32 0.00 0.00 1.33 0.58
33 0.00 0.00 1.33 0.58
34 0.00 0.00 2.33 0.58
35 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
36 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.58
37 0.00 0.00 1.67 1.15
38 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
39 0.00 0.00 1.33 1.15
40 0.00 0.00 1.67 0.58
41 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.58
NUMBER OF ITERIONS 3.
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TABLE XXI
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS IMCREASED MOBILITY






AVERAGE ST. DEVIATION AVERAGE ST. DEVIATION
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
4 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.58
5 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.58
6 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
7 0.00 0.00 1.67 0.58
8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.58
10 0.00 0.00 1.67 0.58
11 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.58
12 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
13 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.58
14 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.58
15 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
17 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
20 0.00 0.00 3.67 1.53
21 0.00 0.00 4.00 1.00
22 0.00 0.00 3.33 1.15
23 0.00 0.00 2.67 0.58
24 0.00 0.00 3.67 2.08
25 0.00 0.00 2.33 1.15
26 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.58
27 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
28 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
29 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
30 0.33 0.58 0.00 0.00
31 0.33 0.58 0.00 0.00
32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
35 0.33 0.58 0.00 0.00
36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
39 0.00 0.00 1.33 0.58
40 0.00 0.00 1.67 0.58
41 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.58
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS 3.
60
TABLE XXII






0.006 0.010 0.206 0.094 0.006 0. 010
MINIMUM 0.006 0.010 0.206 0.094 0.006 0. 010
0.250 0.509 0.156 0.269 0.119 0.114 086
0.500 0.634 0.159 0.429 0.120 0.251 0. 106
0.750 0.709 0.151 0.469 0. 131 0.291 116
1.000 0.749 0.143 0.491 0.139 0.343 130
1.250 0.749 0.143 0.543 0. 133 0.394 131
1.500 0.789 0.133 0.566 0. 127 0.457 131
1.750 0.789 0.133 0.589 0. 130 0.457 131
2.000 0.789 0. 133 0.589 0. 130 0.457 131
2.250 0.789 0.133 0.589 0.130 0.457 131
2.500 0.789 0.133 0.629 0.116 0.497 122
2.750 0.789 0.133 0.629 0.116 0.497 122
3.000 0.789 0.133 0.629 0.116 0.497 122
3.250 0.789 0.133 0.629 0.116 0.497 122
3.500 0.789 0.133 0.629 0.116 0.497 122
3.750 0.789 0.133 0.629 0.116 0.497 122
4.000 0.789 0.133 0.629 0.116 0.497 122
INFINITY 0.789 0.133 0.629 0.116 0.497 122
ITERATIONS 25
give vastly different results for the unit. Reducing the
probability of degradation down only five percent to 25%
provided the capability result in table XXIII. All other
inputs were the same as the base case of chapter two. As
can be seen in table XXIII the capability returns to 98.3%
in one hour.
The sensitivity analysis output from this computer
simulation showed that only the command and control posi-
tions 1,2, and 11 choked on the seventh MET for 3 itera-
tions. What was surprising is that with a 5% drop in
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personnel attrition, no Engineering needs developed. in










0.080 0.055 0.194 0.099 0.046 049
MINIMUM 0.063 0.055 0.194 0.099 0.040 048
0.250 0.731 0. 112 0.463 0. 134 0.337 109
0.500 0.903 0.078 0.554 0.119 0.509 118
0.750 0.937 0.055 0.623 0. 108 0.611 109
1.000 0.983 0.016 0.623 0.108 0.623 108
1.250 0.983 0.016 0.663 0.101 0.657 099
1.500 0.983 0.016 0.663 0.101 0.657 099
1.750 0.983 0.016 0.663 0.101 0.657 099
2.000 0.983 0.016 0.703 0.091 0.697 089
2.250 0.983 0.016 0.703 0.091 0.697 089
2.500 0.983 0.016 0.703 0.091 0.697 089
2.750 0.983 0.016 0.703 0.091 0.697 089
3.000 0.983 0.016 0.703 0.091 0.697 089
3.250 0.983 0.016 0.703 0.091 0.697 089
3.500 0.983 0.016 0.703 0.091 0.697 089
3.750 0.983 0.016 0.703 0.091 0.697 089
4.000 0.983 0.016 0.703 0.091 0.697 089
INFINITY 0.983 0.016 0.703 0.091 0.697 089
ITERATIONS 25
Obtaining five percent less casualties for engi-
neering personnel isn't difficult if these personnel are
instructed to remain inside the ship on their way to station
in a hostile environment. This would reduce their prob-
ability of loss and would be a common reaction anyway.
Analysis of the sens-itivity analysis assignment
matrix for this computer run showed the 00D having a need
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due strictly to attrition, the JOOD position was
substituting for the 00D or the Navplot2 position, which is
in MET six while the JOOD is in MET seven. The CIC
Supervisor (position 11) was substituting for the Navplotl
position. It was the JOOD and CIC Supervisor substituting
for navigation plotters, positions 3 and 4, that caused
mission essential team reconstruction to show needs at MET
seven.
This simple demonstration shows that even small
differences in probabilities of degradation can have large
effects on considerat ionss for training and manning poli-
cies. Degradation probabilities can be input separately for
individual positions as well.
B. SUMMARY OF AMORE MODEL CHANGES
Some strategies for capability enhancement of a naval
destroyer after degradation were attempted. Officer command
and control and engineering personnel chokepoints were
changed in this chapter. Moving chokepoints was attempted
by increasing the transferability of personnel. All of the
changes to model input represented policy changes to an
inport duty section. Having the chief petty officers be
able to substitute for the 00D and JOOD reflects cross-
training. Having the EOOW remain in engineering and not
substitute for the 00D or JOOD represents increased special-
ization for this officer position. Analysis of increasing
mobility into mission essential teams one and two represents
a standard operation procedure of getting a ship underway
with two engines more quickly than attempting to get
underway with one. Different probabilities of degradation
can be the result of protective measures for assets or
differing variables of a hostile environment.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
The Analysis of Military Organizational effectiveness
methodology was demonstrated for naval use. The methodology
is effective at simulating how a unit would respond if
degradation to personnel and materiel were to occur. It can
identify the more critical skill requirements needed for an
organization given specific missions.
A. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
1 . Changes in Subs ti tut ability
Chapter three showed how changes in subst itutability
could reduce or change the needs of an organization.
Changes in substitutability were reflected in training poli-
cies that would provide more substitutes for the command and
control personnel. By exploring more than one training
strategy, better solutions were found than were initially
obvious
.
Having only another officer, the EOOW, substitute
for the 00D and JOOD resulted in an improvement in capa-
bility. Next, training senior enlisted, for instance Chief
Petty Officer line handling supervisors, the capability
again improved but even more so than with just the EOOW
substituting for the 00D and JOOD. Combining all three
positions for the 00D or JOOD (allowing positions 26, 27 and
30 substitute for positions 1 and 2) showed a less optimal
policy because more engineering needs developed. Keeping
the engineering officer in engineering and training chiefs
for increased command and control, proved to be the overall
best solution and more closely follows a new U.S. Navy
Mid-Grade Officer career policy of increased specialization.
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Increased specialization through increased experi-
ence in a specific knowledge area is an increasing policy
trend of the U.S. Navy. A policy change of Surface Warfare
Officers has been enacted in 1983 that requires mid-grade
officers to tour in the same departments: operations, combat
systems, or engineering. This policy provides increased
specialization through emphasized training and experience in
one department instead of several departments. In a letter
from Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare,
Vice Admiral R.L. Walters, stated "Our enlisted need and
expect competent leadership. This new initiative is
intended to strengthen the Surface Warfare Officers' rela-
tionship with enlisted technicians and to provide a strong
professional team of officers and enlisted who can keep a
ship operating to design standards and be able to fight with
unparalleled skill." [Ref. 3]
A proper mix of specialization and appropriate
general knowledge is still the complicated answer to ship
manning. Increased ability of certain critical skills can
be more important in many situations than just overall ship
knowledge. Initially increased specialization may not seem
at all an appropriate solution, but as was seen here,
specialization has merit even with simple analysis.
2. Changing Probability of Degradation
Different expected levels of attrition can effect
training priorities differently. In chapter three it was
seen that even a 5% lower attrition rate for personnel
reduced all needs for engineering personnel.
65
B. DESIGN CHANGES
1. Changing Mission Essential Teams
Changing the priority, or order, of METs is a unit
design change. The design change considered is compatible
with established procedure in handling emergencies. Whether
to just concentrate on one propulsion plant or have an EOOW
present on a bridge are design considerations. A policy of
having one or two engines in operation may depend on initial
strengths available, probabilities of degradation, type of
port the ship is moored, or many other ship or environmental
considerations. Remaining mission capable but also finding
ways to reduce resources in one area may free up assets for
substitution to other areas of greater need. Moving the
EOOW to MET four in chapter three made little difference and
increasing emphasis on mobility made the engineering posi-
tions more critical.




Modifications of input and output to the computer
simulation would make Amore much more useful. A recommended
modification would be adding to the input the ability to
weight the percentage of contribution of mission essential
teams. This modification should also include an output of
mission capability that ties together the weight of contri-
bution of the teams along with the percentage of MET recon-
struction. This would provide an output that would better
display mission capability after reconstruction.
2 Training
Amore can assist a unit in recognizing its limited
flexibility. With that knowledge a unit will be able to
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develop operating procedures and training policies to
increase its flexibility. With Amore isolating potential
choke areas, specific areas where cross- training could be
most beneficial would be identified. Concentrating unit
training on the skills that choke will increase the capa-
bility of the unit as soon as possible.
Communication of the results of Amore analysis to
personnel could act as encouragement for personnel receiving
cross- training . The increase in unit capability effective-
ness through increased personnel transferability should be
demonstrated to personnel who are required to put forth
additional effort in cross- training . This is especially
easy to accomplish if the analysis is being conducted at
the unit level. When different probabilities of degradation
to assets are simulated with the model, skill needs and
surpluses are identified. The surpluses can show where
supply availability exists for possible cross- training
programs for skills that are needed.
3 . Skill Requirements
The Amore methodology forces a unit to determine the
most essential skills required. Once the more important
skills are identified, the limited time available for
training can be optimized. Skill requirements can change
with missions. Also, improved technology can change or
eliminate previously important personnel skills.
Modernization overhauls and ship alterations accomplished
during maintenance availabilities inport may alter skill
requirements
.
Having the Amore process established ahead of time
for many emergency contingencies can save time by having a




4. Nothing Stays The Same
The dynamic world environment, different personnel,
materiel, and mission requirements, can be quickly analyzed
with the Amore model. When the requirements or the assets of
an organization change, the organization's priorities in
training can change. Being able to identify quickly what




Attrition does not always imply combat casualties.
Personnel loss can occur due to leave, school training off
ship, or unauthorized absence. A predetermined loss can be
reflected through changes in initial strength assignment or
by changes to the transfer matrix. Other non-combat attri-
tion could result from new personnel being confused and
showing up to fill the wrong team or just plain getting lost
in the confusion that often results in emergency situations.
6 MET Contribution and Interdependence
Seldom, if ever, are the mission essential teams
equal in contribution when an entire ship is analyzed. Not
only do the contributions vary depending on the mission, but
also a great interdependence of mission essential teams
exists. For instance, detection and weapons teams require
electrical power. This electrical power can only come from
the engineering teams. Weapons and detection teams are more
able to substitute for each other, but not for engineering
teams when steam operated equipment is used. Gas turbine
and remote operation technology of all Frigates, Destroyers,
and Cruisers now under construction in the U.S. Navy may
reduce the differences however.
Construction of mission essential teams for most
warfare scenarios would require electrical generation
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ability as a first MET. But the contribution of this MET is
difficult to determine. A unit with full engineering
ability but with problems in weapons or detection ability
would be less than 100% capable if any at-sea war missions
were analyzed.
Because the Amore model is a tool available with
microcomputer technology, it is available at the unit level.
For some situations Amore is more useful in naval applica-
tion than other unit capability models. This methodology is
most useful when the contributions of mission essential
teams are approximately equal. Even if teams are not equal
in weight, there needs to be much duplication of assets so
that, if one team cannot be reconstructed, mission accom-
plishment is still possible. An example of this was the
underway scenario of the base case. The mobility mission






A ship of the Adams Class has many different readi-
ness standards while inport. In increasing order of readi-
ness, a ship can be in overhaul, maintenance availability in
homeport , inport working up for deployment, or inport over-
seas. These various readiness statuses required different
sets of skills. With Amore identifying the more critical
skill requirements, a prioritized training plan can be
developed to prepare personnel for increased levels of read-
iness. Training is often easier when the ship is in over-
haul or other reduced levels of readiness.
8 Unit Design
Amore can help determine optimum manning for inport
duty sections. Simulations of possible emergency contingen-
cies of inport duty sections could identify the minimum
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skill functions required to perform various missions at a
satisfactory level. This methodology could be used to
update the number of possible inport duty sections for a
ship. The number of duty sections would depend upon the
readiness status which imposes mission requirements and the
skill availability of the currently assigned crew. The
skill availability is dynamic and varies due to experience,
turnover, numbers of personnel at school, on leave, or
absent for whatever reasons
.
With different levels of inport readiness mentioned
earlier, most ships have leave policy authorization amounts
of 107o, 257 or 50% depending on operating schedule and
holiday seasons. The effects of leave policies on duty
sections and the resultant effect on ability to handle emer-
gency situations can be analyzed. Other scheduled losses of
personnel could be analyzed as well.
9 . Reservations
Many assumptions for the base case were made by this
author. The mission essential team construction and minimum
skills required could have been different for different
analysts. The times for transfer were very arbitrary as
only aggregate abilities of observed typical personnel skill
types were used. This thesis wasn't meant to be an argument
for inport duty section manning needs and surpluses of an
Adams Class Destroyer, but an argument for the possible use
of Amore on this and similar classes of ships. For overall
naval use Amore appears most useful for minor specific
mission analysis such as inport duty section planning,
rather than major at-sea warfare scenarios.
Recent naval battle scenarioes, such as the
Falklands War, show that mission essential team reconstruc-
tion is often impossible if even one or two teams are
attrited. A missile or bomb hit at various sections of the
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ship may represent only 10 to 20 percent attrition, but the
ship will still sink. A hit to a ship even though initially
causing low attrition can in itself change the mission of a
ship from fighting to just trying to survive.
Substituting men and machinery for those that have
suffered attrition is not a new idea for the Navy. For
naval ship design and policies of manning; duplication,
isolation, and separation of engineering, weapons, and
detection systems are basic requirements. These have given
many ships flexibility from designed backup systems as well
as the ability to isolate and control any initial damage.
The damage control organizational philosophy of isolating,
controlling, and containing damage along with backups built
into various systems provides navy ships with a large amount
of resiliency.
The U.S. Navy often looks at teams as isolated
components, each providing their ability to the overall
capability of the ship. Degradation to one team (for
instance an engineroom) would have casualty control proce-
dures isolating or bypassing the compartment until repairs
could be made. Because of the power generating capability of
an engineroom and the electrical product of this team, which
is required by other mission essential teams, any engineroom
would be considered essential. But materiel design, oper-
ating procedures, and training drills currently are all
practiced to give a ship nearly complete capability even if
a vital (essential) team, such as an engineroom, were
completely lost. Reconstruction of degraded assets isn't
always the priority; backup and alternative procedures
usually are. The Adams Class destroyer is a good example
of multiple backup design and practice.
The interdependency of Mission Essential Teams and
the difficulty in being able to determine contribution of
each MET makes use of Amore difficult in Naval application.
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Adding to the argument against naval use of Amore are single
degradation hits that a ship can take, which in terms of
attrition are small, but the effects to ship capability
could be very large. The model itself appears to make the
assumption that a substitution once complete gives a team
the same capability as before degradation. Intuitively this
doesn't appear to be always true.
D. FURTHER STUDY
Possible follow-on research with this methodology would
probably best be approached as a group or team effort. With
more experts of varied technical experience but similar
platform experience an improved analysis of greater depth
may be possible.
The assumptions made here were general and the analysis
was primarily of personnel. Combining materiel and
personnel may produce useful findings not observed with this
simple analysis.
The strongest argument against further naval application
of Amore is the problem of inter-dependency of mission
essential team construction. This serious problem must be
addressed. Also, providing a mechanism for weighting the
contribution of each mission essential team should be accom-
plished prior to any further naval application.
72
APPENDIX A
EXAMPLE OF MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAMS OF U.S. ARMY TANK COMPANY
MISSION ESSENTIAL
TEAMS PERSONNEL MATERIEL
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15. Resupply Team 3 Hvy Vehicle
Driver










































1 Ml Tank Main
Supervisor
2 Ml Auto Mech
1 -Tac Commo Mech
2 Ml Tank Turret
1 Carrier Personnel
1 Truck Cargo:















































DESCRIPTION OF PERSONNEL POSITIONS OF BASE CASE
These are definitions used in AMORE output tables. Each
watchstation has title and what military rank usually would
be in the position as well as a brief description of the
watchstation.
1-OOD-Of f icer of the Deck- Officer in charge of the
operation. Usually the senior personnel on the bridge. LT
.
(0-3) or LCDR (0-4)
.
2- J00D- Junior Officer of the Deck- Usually the Officer
conning (driving) the ship if the 00D is not. ENS (0-1) or
LTjg (0-2).
3-NAVPLOTl-Navigation Plotter-Usually senior
Quartermaster onboard. Does navigational plotting on chart
on bridge, receiving input from bearing takers and also
directs those bearing takers on what landmarks they are to
take bearings on. This position coordinates entire visual
navigation effort. QM1 (E-6) or QM2 (E-5) or QM3 (E-4).
4-NAVPL0T2- Navigational Plotter 2- Assistant to
NAVPL0T1, would record bearings and assist in coordinating
bridge wing bearing takers. QM2 (E-5) or QM3 (E-4).
5-STB BRG- Starboard Bridge Wing Bearing Taker-
Quartermaster type duty, takes bearings with telescopic
aledaide on fixed reference points on land such as water
towers or prominent buildings.
6-PORT BRG- Port Bridge Wing Bearing Taker- Same as
position 5 except on left side of the bridge.
7-BM0W- Boatswain Mate of the Watch- Supervises all
enlisted bridge personnel, passes all word for 00D over IMC.
BM2 (E-5).
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8-HELM- Helmsman- Steers the ship- Executes to all
steering orders given by Conning Officer which is either 00D
or J00D.BM3 (E-4)or BMSN (E-3).
9- LEE HELM- Gives engine orders to EOOW via Engine
Order Telegraph. BM- 3 (E-4) BMSN (E-3).
10- BRIDGE STAT BOARD- Records all information from
Combat Information Center on Status Board located in back of
bridge. BMSN (E-3).
11-CIC RADAR PLOT- Plots radar navigation on chart,
inputs provided from RADAR NAV with surface search radar,
this plot is checked with the navigation plot on the bridge.
0S2 (E-5).
12- RADAR NAV- Provides navigational input to NAV PLOT
via surface search radar. 0S3 (E-4).
13-CIC SURFACE SEARCH- Surf ace search operator that looks
out for shipping provides warning for 00D via the BRIDGE
STAT BOARD position. 0S3 (E-4).
14- NC2 PLOT- Plots all shipping in real world frame-
work, assists in warning 00D of possible shipping hazards
via BRIDGE STAT BOARD position. 0S3 (E-4).
15- BRIDGE 1JV PHONE-Phone talker on bridge in communi-
cation with Engineers and line handlers on forecastle and
fantail. SN (E-3).
16-BRIDGE JL-JA PHONE- Phone talker on bridge with
communication of Bearing takers and lookouts. SN (E-3).
17-FORECASTLE 1JV PHONE- Phone talker relaying informa-
tion to and from Bridge and forward line handlers. SN
(E-3).
18-FANTAIL 1JV PHONE - Phone talker after part of ship
relaying information to and from the fantail and the bridge
concerning line handling and any additional information
useful to the OOD
.
19-CIC SUP_ Cic Supervisor, coordinates all action going
on in CIC including ship control, radar navigation, and any
radio net circuits. OS1 (E-6) 0S2 (E-5).
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20-21-23-24-Line 1,2,4,5, NON TECH-Personnel initially
assigned as line handlers that are normally assigned to non
technical ratings such as Cook, Gunners Mates and ordinary
Seaman. (E-5) through (E-l).
22-25-LINE 3,6 TECH- Personnel initially assigned as
line handlers that are in technical type ratings such as
ET-Electronic Technician etc. (E-6) through (E-2).
26- 1ST LT -Senior person on Forecastle supervisor of
forward line handlers as well as anchors. Usually an
Officer or Chief Petty Officer. (0-2) (0-1) (E-8) (E-7).
27-OIC/CPO AFT LINES- In charge of personnel manning the
after lines. (E-8) (E-7).
28-RADIO SUP - Senior enlisted in Radio, Sets in radio
transmitters for CIC and Bridge and covers Fleet Broadcast
.
(E-7) (E-6) (E-5).
29-RADIO ASSIST - Assistant to Radio Supervisor. (E-4)
(E-3).
30-EOOW- ENGINEERING OFFICER OF THE WATCH-Overall in
charge of all engineering propulsion and auxiliary. (0-4)
through(O-l) (E-8) (E-7).
31-BT0W -BOILER TECHNICIAN OF THE WATCH - Senior BT in
Fireroom, operates all automatic boiler controls, supervi-
sors start and operation of all equipment in fireroom. (E-8)
through (E-5).
32-UL - UPPER LEVEL MAN - Monitors boiler water level
and insures proper level is maintained, starts and operates
all fireroom equipment on upper level. (E-5) (E-4).
33-BN- BURNERMAN - Operates boiler front. (E-4) (E-3).
34-FIRER00M MSG - Monitors all remote gauges in fire-
room, general assistant. (E-3) (E-2).
35-MMOW- MACHINIST MATE OF THE WATCH - Senior Machinist
Mate supervisors all start and operation of all equipment in
engine room. (E-8) (E-7) (E-6).
36-LL -LOWER LEVELMAN - Operates all equipment on Engine
Room lower level. (E-5) (E-4).
37-THROTTLES - Operates Engine Throttles for ahead and
astern operation of propeller. (E-4) (E-3).
38-ENGINE MSG - Engine Room Messenger, assists MMOW,
monitors all engine room remote gauges. (E-3) (E-2).
39-SSTG SWBD Operator- Ships service turbine generator
Switchboard Operator, Controls and monitors 60 cycle 400
volt electrical distribution throughout the ship. (E-3)
through (E-7).
40- Gyro Watch_ Starts up the electic compass for true
vice magnetic north, also controls all internal communica-
tion switchboards. (E-3) through (E-6).
41- After Steering - Starts the Steering motors and is
backup steering control for the bridge. (E-3) through (E-6).
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APPENDIX C
TRANSFER MATRIX OF SORTIE PERSONNEL
TRANSFER MATRIX FOR PERSONNEL
4
1 OOD C) f> I » 1 1 C> 1
2 JOOD 1 C) 1 1 1 111
3 NAVPLOT1 C) c) 1 i :» 1
4 NAVPLOT2 C) c) 1 1 ! » 1
5 STB BRG c) f» 1 . 1
6 PORT BRG c) !) 1 . 1
7 BMOW 1 1 c)
8 HELM 1 1 I >
9 LEE HELM 1 1 f>
10 BRIDGE STAT BOARD 1 1 f>
11 CIC SUPERVISOR i 1 . 5
12 CIC RADAR NAV PLOT ill 1 . 1
13 SPS 10 RADAR NAV 115 5 . 5
14 RADAR SURFACE SEARCH 10 10 5 5 . 10
15 NC2/DRT PLOT 5 5 . 5
16 1JV BRIDGE PHONE 10 10 . 1
17 JA/JL BRIDGE PHONE
18 1JV FORECASTLE
10 10 . 1
15 15 5
19 1 JV FANTAIL ,
20 LINE 1 NON TECH PERS 10
21 LINE 2 NON TECH PERS 15
22 LINE 3 TECH PERS 5 5 .
23 LINE 4 NON TECH PERS 10
24 LINE 5 NON TECH PERS .
25 LINE 6 TECH PERS 5
26 1ST LT FORECASTLE 5 5 I5 5









3 6 LOWER LEVELMAN
37 THROTTLE
38 ENGINEROOM MESSENGER
39 SSTG SWBD OPERATOR
40 GYRO WATCH
41 AFTER STEERING ; io
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TRANSFER MATRIX FOR PERSONNEL
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 OOD 1 15 5 5 5 5 5
2 JOOD 1 1 10 5 5 5 5 5
3 NAVPLOT1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5
4 NAVPLOT2 1 10 5 5 5 5 5
5 STB BRG 1 1 10 1
6 PORT BRG 1 1 10 1
7 BMOW 1
8 HELM 1
9 LEE HELM 1
10 BRIDGE STAT BOARD 1
11 CIC SUPERVISOR 1 1 1 1 1 10
12 CIC RADAR NAV PLOT 1 15 1 1 1 1 1
13 SPS 10 RADAR NAV 2 1 1 1 1
14 RADAR SURFACE SEARCH 10 5 10 2 2
15 NC2/DRT PLOT 5 3 3 3 2
16 1JV BRIDGE PHONE 1 1




19 1 JV FANTAIL 5
20 LINE 1 NON TECH PERS 5 5 5
21 LINE 2 NON TECH PERS 5 5 5
22 LINE 3 TECH PERS 5 5 5 5 5 5
23 LINE 4 NON TECH PERS 8 5 5
24 LINE 5 NON TECH PERS 5 5
25 LINE 6 TECH PERS 5 5 5
26 1ST LT FORECASTLE 5 5 5










3 6 LOWER LEVELMAN
3 7 THROTTLE
38 ENGINEROOM MESSENGER
39 SSTG SWBD OPERATOR
40 GYRO WATCH
41 AFTER STEERING 10
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TRANSFER MATRIX FOR PERSONNEL
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1 OOD 5 5 5
2 JOOD 5 5 5 B , , ,
3 NAVPLOT1 5 5 5 10 10 10 10 10 10
4 NAVPLOT2 5 5 5 10 10 10 10 10 10
5 STB BRG 1 5 5 10 10 10 10 10 10
6 PORT BRG 1 5 5 10 10 10 10 10 10
7 BMOW 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
8 HELM 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
- 9 LEE HELM 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
10 BRIDGE STAT BOARD 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
11 CIC SUPERVISOR 1 5 5 10 10 10 10 10 10
12 CIC RADAR NAV PLOT 1 5 5 10 10 10 10 10 10
13 SPS 10 RADAR NAV 1 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
14 RADAR SURFACE SEARCH 2 5 5 10 10 10 10 10 10
15 NC2/DRT PLOT 2 8 8 10 10 10 10 10 10
16 1JV BRIDGE PHONE 1 5 5 8 8 8 8 8 8
17 JA/JL BRIDGE PHONE
1JV FORECASTLE
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
18 5 5 1 1 1 5 5 5
19 1 JV FANTAIL 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1
20 LINE 1 NON TECH PERS 5 1 5 5 5 5
21 LINE 2 NON TECH PERS 5 1 5 5 5 5
22 LINE 3 TECH PERS 5 1 5 5 5 5
23 LINE 4 NON TECH PERS 5 5 1 5 5 5
24 LINE 5 NON TECH PERS 5 5 3 5 5 5
25 LINE 6 TECH PERS 5 5 1 5 5 5
26 1ST LT FORECASTLE 5 1 5 1 1 1 5 5
27 OIC/CPO AFT LINES
RADIO SUPERVISOR











38 ENGINEROOM MESSENGER .














10 BRIDGE STAT BOARD
11 CIC SUPERVISOR
12 CIC RADAR NAV PLOT
13 SPS 10 RADAR NAV
14 RADAR SURFACE SEARCH
15 NC2/DRT PLOT
16 1JV BRIDGE PHONE
17 JAyjL BRIDGE PHONE
18 1JV FORECASTLE
19 1 JV FANTAIL
20 LINE 1 NON TECH PERS
21 LINE 2 NON TECH PERS
22 LINE 3 TECH PERS
23 LINE 4 NON TECH PERS
24 LINE 5 NON TECH PERS
25 LINE 6 TECH PERS
26 1ST LT FORECASTLE









3 6 LOWER LEVELMAN
3 7 THROTTLE
38 ENGINEROOM MESSENGER
39 SSTG SWBD OPERATOR
40 GYRO WATCH
41 AFTER STEERING


















TRANSFER MATRIX FOR PERSONNEL





5 STB BRG 10
6 PORT BRG ....... 10
7 BMOW ....... 5
8 HELM 5
9 LEE HELM 10
10 BRIDGE STAT BOARD ....... 10
11 CIC SUPERVISOR . 15
12 CIC RADAR NAV PLOT ...
13 SPS 10 RADAR NAV
14 RADAR SURFACE SEARCH
15 NC2/DRT PLOT
16 1JV BRIDGE PHONE 10
17 JA/JL BRIDGE PHONE ....... 15
18 1JV FORECASTLE ...
19 1 JV FANTAIL
20 LINE 1 NON TECH PERS
21 LINE 2 NON TECH PERS
22 LINE 3 TECH PERS
23 LINE 4 NON TECH PERS
24 LINE 5 NON TECH PERS
25 LINE 6 TECH PERS 3
26 1ST LT FORECASTLE
27 OIC/CPO AFT LINES FANTAIL
28 RADIO SUPERVISOR
29 RADIO ASSISTENT ........
30 EOOW 15 5 10 1 10 5 5 10
31 BTOW 3 10 15 15 15 15 30 30
32 UPPER LEVELMAN 1 30 30 5 15 60 90 90
33 BURNERMAN 1 . 5 15
34 FIREROOM MESSENGER . 5 10 .
35 MMOW 15 2 2 5 10
3 6 LOWER LEVELMAN .10 1 1 15 .
37 THROTTLE . . 5 1 60 .
38 ENGINEROOM MESSENGER . . 20 5 .
39 SSTG SWBD OPERATOR ..... 5
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